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Abstract
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have become
ubiquitous in the current debate and have emerged as the
key issue of global innovation policy. The ‘Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ (TRIPS)
Agreement, signed in 1994 as a founding element of the
World Trade Organisation, represents the most
important attempt to establish a global harmonisation of
Intellectual Property protection. The aim of this article
is to re-examine critically what has become the common
wisdom around IPRs, TRIPS and their effects. We
argue that supporters of IPRs in western corporations
and governments as well as detractors in global
movements and developing countries have
overestimated their importance in the process of
generation and diffusion of knowledge and innovation.
On the basis of some key learned lessons on the nature of
innovation and technological change, we assess four
theses about TRIPS and its impact on the global
generation and distribution of knowledge. Finally, the
policy implications concerning international
organisations and technological transfer are discussed.
Policy Implications
• Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have emerged
as the key issue of global innovation policy:
through the ‘Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights’ (TRIPS) Agreement, there is an
attempt to impose worldwide a western system of
IPRs.
• Western governments and large corporations claim
that strong IPRs are needed to maintain invest-
ment in innovation. This position is contrasted
by new political and social movements, which
assert that muscular IPRs enforcement hampers
economic growth and welfare in developing coun-
tries. The article argues that both positions over-
emphasise what IPRs can actually do to promote
or obstruct innovation.
• IPRs per se do not allow companies to appropriate
the returns from their innovations unless they are
matched to a wide-ranging strategy that includes
continuous learning and dynamic innovation.
• There are substantial cross-industry differences in
the role played by IPRs: while patents are quite
significant in pharmaceuticals and copyright is
important in the audiovisual industry, the majority
of sectors are not seriously affected by either
strong or weak IPR regimes.
• In order to catch up, developing countries should
put specific policies in place to nurture their
absorptive capacity through the creation of appro-
priate infrastructure and human resources. Compe-
tence building is not hampered by IPRs.
Developing countries should concentrate on active
learning policies to acquire the knowledge of the
most industrialised nations.
• Western nations would better protect their well-
being by focusing on promoting new knowledge
and creativity rather than by impeding new
entrants from accessing the know-how they have
already generated.
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) have become ubiquitous
in the economic debate: the front pages of newspapers
continually report major controversies among corporations,
governments and advocacy groups. News such as the copy-
right issue of the Google Books project and the power of
the Big Pharma’s patents over key drugs and vaccines have
generated growing alarms and heated disputes. Some
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books, including Naomi Klein’s No Logo and Vandana
Shiva’s Patents: Myth and Reality have become best-sellers.
Science fiction has been quick to report these concerns, as
shown by Michael Crichton’s Next. National parliaments,
the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Free
Trade Association (NAFTA) are repeatedly addressing the
issue. A brand new Pirate party, whose main political goal
is to get free access to software and copyrighted products,
has even managed to elect its own deputies at the Euro-
pean Parliament. Above all, IPRs have become one of the
core businesses of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
In a word, IPRs have emerged as the key issue of global
innovation policy.
The ‘Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights’ (TRIPS) Agreement, signed in 1994, is a founding
element of the WTO. TRIPS constitutes the most
important attempt to establish a global harmonisation of
Intellectual Property (IP) protection and enforcement, cre-
ating international standards for the protection of patents,
copyrights, trademarks and design. It also provides a dis-
pute settlement schema and establishes enforcement proce-
dures at the intergovernmental level. Not surprisingly,
TRIPS has been highly debated by political scientists
(May, 2002a; Ryan, 1998; Sell, 2003) and economists
(Maskus, 2000; Maskus and Reichman, 2005, among oth-
ers). But TRIPS has also been debated outside academe
and has been vigorously opposed by nongovernmental
organisations and global movements (Drahos and Mayne,
2002).
The aim of this article is to re-examine critically what
has become the common wisdom around IPRs, TRIPS and
their effects. We argue that there has been an overestima-
tion of the importance of IPRs in the process of generation
and diffusion of knowledge and innovation. For both
developed and developing countries, the key issue should
be an active innovation and learning policy rather than the
protection through IPRs of the already available knowl-
edge. The debate has instead been concentrated on IPRs as
such rather than on knowledge generation and diffusion
because some key learned lessons on the nature of innova-
tion and technological change have not been duly taken
into account. On the basis of these learned lessons, we will
assert four theses about TRIPS.
This article will mainly focus on patents, while it will
deal less with copyright and other IPRs (for a comprehen-
sive collection of essays on this issue see Hess and Ostrom,
2006; see also Macmillan, 2006 for a focus on copyrights).
In the next section we provide the rationale behind the
establishment of the IPRs systems across modern societies.
Section 2 presents four learned lessons that emerge from
the literature of the economics of innovation and techno-
logical change. In Section 3 we present four main theses
on the globalisation of IPRs and their effects on the global
generation and distribution of knowledge. The final section
discusses policy implications.
1. The Faustian bargain and the rationale for
intellectual property rights
The modern patent system, based on the objective assess-
ment of inventions, was introduced by the Venetian Repub-
lic in 1474 (May, 2002b). The two requirements indicated
by the Venetian Republic – the usefulness and novelty of
the invention – are still in vigour today in all states. As in a
Faustian bargain, the inventor and the government under-
take a long-term pact: the inventor commits him ⁄herself to
disclose all information of his ⁄her invention, while the gov-
ernment guarantees that it will provide legal protection to
give exclusive rights on the economic returns of the inven-
tion (for a history of IPRs, see May and Sell, 2006).1
IPRs have evolved substantially over the centuries but
the Faustian bargain has remained unchanged. By provid-
ing intellectual property rights, the government assures the
inventor the right to exclude others from using the out-
come of his ⁄her creative activities without his ⁄her authori-
sation. Thus the government gives the inventor a legal
monopoly to exploit his ⁄her invention and capture the eco-
nomic benefits for a limited period of time. Legislation is
far from uniform: for copyright the disclosure is complete
by the moment you publish a book or a film, while inven-
tions generally have to pass a merit exam before being
granted a patent. As happens with many deals, this one is
rarely fully implemented and the inventor often tries to
hide as much as possible about his ⁄her invention, while the
government is not in a position to assure full appropriation
of the returns of the invention.
Through this deal, the government manages to disclose
information on the already generated knowledge, and per-
haps more importantly it provides an incentive to individu-
als to invest their time and resources in creative activities.
Creative activities are in fact time consuming and costly
while it is always uncertain if they will produce something
that will generate economic returns. Once the inventor has
discovered a new device or a musician has written a new
symphony, it becomes easy for others to exploit their out-
comes at very low costs. Without legal protection, inven-
tors and authors are not in a position fully to exploit their
works and appropriate the economic returns. As a result, in
the absence of public regulation there would be an under-
investment in creative activities that would be below a
socially desirable level.
An IPR regime can be defined as the written and cus-
tomary rules that apply within a specific political commu-
nity. In some countries, the government enforces strong
protection of IPRs and the holders are guaranteed that any
infringements will be persecuted by the law and compensa-
tion will be obtained. These are the strong IPRs regimes.
In other countries, the IPRs regime is much weaker and
there is much less public interest in enforcing IPRs. Polic-
ing violation is much more relaxed and courts are slow
and ⁄ or permissive towards infringement.
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2. What we have learned about knowledge and
innovation: four learned lessons
Scholars in the field of innovation have largely explored
the mechanism that lies at the heart of the creation and
diffusion of knowledge and innovation, as well as the
mechanism of technological change. In this section we will
briefly outline four learned lessons derived from this body
of literature that are relevant to assessment of the current
IPRs controversy.
Lesson 1: Knowledge is not information. Successful knowl-
edge transfer is not only a matter of transferring informa-
tion, but it requires learning through acquiring a wide
range of competences, skills and tacit knowledge.
There is a basic distinction between information and knowl-
edge. Information is a good that is costly to produce but
which by the moment it becomes public can be appropri-
ated and transmitted at very low costs. Since all the costs
are on the shoulders of the producers of information and
there is no cost on the users, the lack of institutional pro-
tection would likely lead to an underinvestment in these
activities (Arrow, 1962). But can the outcomes of the crea-
tive and innovative activities for which intellectual property
is requested be considered information? The Schumpeterian
tradition argues that creative and innovative activities are
the product of human knowledge, which cannot be trans-
ferred to potential users unless they are willing to invest
effort and time in learning. Knowledge is therefore rather
different from information since no user will be in a posi-
tion to gain economic advantages from it without an active
learning effort and creative adaptive processes (Nelson and
Winter, 1982, p. 60; Pavitt, 1987).
But this is not the full story. There is another important
aspect that makes the transfer of knowledge difficult to
achieve: not all knowledge can be properly codified. An
important component of knowledge is tacit (Polanyi, 1967)
and not even those who have generated it are able to artic-
ulate it properly in manuals, blueprints, patents or other
‘codes’. A good cook is not necessarily able to transfer all
his ⁄her knowledge in a book of recipes. We are dealing
with tacit knowledge when ‘we know more than what we
can tell’ (Polanyi, 1967, p. 4). In order to transfer tacit
knowledge to an apprentice, the coded component should
be complemented with experimentation and training.
A key characteristic of IPRs is that they can protect the
codified knowledge but not the tacit knowledge.
The picture is therefore more complex than it may
appear in the first instance. On the one hand, the produc-
ers of knowledge have a wider battery of instruments to
profit from it, ranging from selling the codified component
through the IPRs system to transferring it through
direct contact (for example through teaching programmes,
technical cooperation and so on). On the other hand, those
willing to acquire knowledge should also invest their
resources not just to buy IPRs, but also to get the infra-
structures and the skills that make it possible actually to
use knowledge for economic purposes.
Lesson 2: Without imitating it is impossible to learn and
innovate. The development of emerging economies is asso-
ciated with creative imitation and absorption.
Pablo Picasso once stated that ‘good artists copy, great
artists steal’. This also applies to knowledge generation:
innovation cannot be created in a vacuum but rather is bred
in an environment of creative imitation. In the 19th cen-
tury, Germany and the United States benefited from the
knowledge developed in the United Kingdom. In the sec-
ond half of the 20th century, all countries that successfully
managed to catch up, including Japan, South Korea, Singa-
pore and Taiwan, undertook a process of continuous adop-
tion and imitation of technologies developed abroad.
Today, China, India and Brazil, among others, are acquir-
ing the knowledge developed in the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries.
Every ‘emerging economy’ at some point in its history has
relied on the adoption of foreign technologies.2 Technology
transfer is a multidimensional phenomenon and to be
effective it should pay attention to the features of the host
countries, including their stage of development, economic
and industrial base, characteristics of the institutions and
last and not least the IPRs regime.
There is not a single channel that guarantees successful
technology and knowledge transfer. On the contrary, each
knowledge domain requires activating a variety of intercon-
nected channels, including: (1) foreign direct investments,
since the branches of multinational corporations in host
countries often provide the most straightforward way to
assimilate production methods of other countries; (2) joint
ventures and strategic alliances, which allow companies of
different countries to combine their skills, resources and
expertise; (3) technology licensing, which includes not just
the acquisition of IPRs but also technical assistance and
training; and (4) technology embodied in imports, espe-
cially in the case of capital goods and equipment.
Lesson 3: Knowledge is not about plug and play. To adopt
foreign technology is a costly activity requiring a big delib-
erate domestic effort.
The availability of scientific knowledge and technology
from abroad is only part of the story, but it is not as such
sufficient to foster development driven by technological
change. The other part of the story is the endogenous
effort that catching-up countries should be willing to
undertake. In order to make sense and exploit the spectrum
of knowledge, competences and technologies coming from
abroad, each country needs to develop an ‘absorptive capac-
ity’, that is, the endogenous capacity to learn from these
opportunities and to exploit them economically (Cohen
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and Levinthal, 1989, 1990). This reminds us that learning
is not a fully passive process. Countries need to monitor
the advances occurring abroad, to create internal compe-
tences able to adopt foreign technologies and put in place
specific measures to encourage their diffusion in the whole
economy.
Creating such an environment requires a comprehensive
effort ranging from public policies, education and human
resources, a reliable legislative system and institutions,
incentives and trade policies, sometimes referred to as devel-
opmental state.3 In the second half of the 20th century, wes-
tern technology was equally available to Latin American
and to East Asian countries, but only the latter countries
have managed to acquire it to a point where they are able to
compete on a par, mostly because of the active learning
policies implemented (Wong, 2004; Woo-Cumings, 1999).
National R&D investment to absorb foreign technology
has been a crucial enabling factor for US economic growth
during the 1900–1946 period (Mowery and Rosenberg,
1989) and for Japanese reconstruction during the postwar
period (Morishima, 1982). This is often associated with
the activities carried out by both business and the public
sectors. Firms in catching-up countries need to invest in
R&D, capital goods, equipment and infrastructures to
develop the appropriate knowledge and capabilities to
adopt foreign knowledge (Freeman, 1987; Hou and San,
1993; Mowery and Oxley, 1997; Westphal et al., 1985). In
turn governments need to implement dedicated policies to
foster public R&D and education as well as to support
trade and foreign direct investment (Bell and Pavitt, 1997).
Countries that have succeeded in catching up relied on a
combination of devices to acquire foreign technology with
policies aimed at building competences and skills internally.
Lesson 4: The ways to profit from innovation are infinite.
IPRs are only one of the several tools in firms’ competition
and are effective in a few industries only.
Innovation is one of the most heterogeneous economic
activities. A hairpin and a song, a jet engine and a statisti-
cal method, a drug and a machine tool could all be innova-
tions. The heterogeneous nature of the phenomenon is
equally reflected in the sources and methods employed to
appropriate the returns provided by innovation activities.
The methods to guarantee returns from innovations vary
considerably across industries, markets and countries, and
also evolve over time. The most effective way to appropri-
ate the returns from innovation is by combining a battery
of different strategies (Teece, 1986).
The methods used by firms to appropriate returns from
their innovations can be broadly divided into two large
categories. The first category comprises the legal methods
associated with IPRs. The second category is represented
by other economic methods, which include industrial
secrecy, lead time, differentiation and market distribution.
The relative importance of the two categories varies
considerably across technologies and industries. But a
wealth of empirical studies has consistently shown that
IPRs alone cannot guarantee the full appropriation of
innovations.4 On the grounds of in-depth statistical sur-
veys carried out at the firm level, it emerges that patents,
the most important and controversial component in the
IPRs family, are very important only in the pharmaceutical
industry, and, to a lesser extent, in the chemical industry.
But patents are not a key competitive factor in other
high-tech industries such as electronics, telecommunica-
tion, motor vehicles and machinery. In some high-tech
industries such as aerospace and nuclear energy, patents
are not important at all since industrial secrecy is much
more relevant. Profit-seeking firms implement other strate-
gies to exploit innovation including lead time, moving
down the learning curve, sales and service efforts and
secrecy. In the computer industry firms are increasingly
relying on new forms of IPRs such as the GNU General
Public Licence (GPL) for the development of so-called
open source software. Contrary to the traditional IPRs
logic, the GPL allows anyone to use and modify the soft-
ware. As a result, we have witnessed over the last decade
the emergence of new business models in this industry
that allow firms to profit from relying on new strategies
based on combinations of ‘traditional’ and new forms of
IPRs (Chesbrough, 2003; Lerner and Tirole, 2002;
Tapscott and Williams, 2006). Other significant differ-
ences emerge according to the individual characteristics of
new technologies and, as expected, patents are better able
to protect product rather than process innovations.
This does not necessarily imply that firms consider pat-
ents useless; it would be difficult otherwise to explain why
firms bother to file, apply and pay for several hundred
thousand patents every year. But even when they have a
substantial patent portfolio, firms declare that they are not
able to profit from them unless they combine legal protec-
tion with other economic instruments of appropriation.
While there is abundant evidence on the manufacturing
industry and on the patent system, there is less evidence on
the appropriability system in the service industry and on the
copyright (for a significant exception, see Blind et al.,
2003). But the available evidence suggests that manufac-
turing and services on the one hand, and patents and
copyrights on the other, have several similarities. A few
industries rely strongly on copyright and are damaged
by copyright infringement. Cartoon films, for example,
appear to rely on strong copyright systems as much as the
pharmaceutical industry relies on patents. But copyright
enforcement alone cannot guarantee the full appropriation
of returns unless it is combined with other economic
instruments. Similarly, in the industrial design sector, firms
do not rely so much on the effectiveness of design registra-
tion as a means to protect their new products (Filippetti,
2009).
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The innovator’s and the imitator’s perspectives are quite
symmetrical. Strong regimes of IPRs make imitation
slightly more costly and slower but not impossible since
there is often a possibility to ‘invent around’, namely a set
of activities through which a competitor can produce an
effective functional substitute for the product protected by
IPRs without infringing its legal rights. By contrast, weak
regimes of IPRs make imitation cheaper and faster. But
prospective imitators need to acquire a wide range of
expertise that can be achieved through a substantial invest-
ment in building the knowledge base requested.
3. Four theses on the globalisation of
intellectual property rights
On the grounds of the learned lessons summarised above,
how can we interpret the current controversy on the global
regime of IPRs and, in particular, TRIPS? We affirm in
this section four theses that in their respective ways place
much of what has become the traditional wisdom in a dif-
ferent context.
First thesis: TRIPS aims to impose the western and
broken IP regime on the rest of the world
A silent revolution in IPRs began in the United States. Over
the last few decades, the United States has introduced sev-
eral institutional changes that strengthened the IPRs
regime. These changes have generated greater penalties for
IPRs infringement, allowed Intellectual Property for pub-
licly funded R&D and enlarged the scope of patents into
unexpected areas: in a nutshell they have introduced a
‘silent revolution’ (Andersen, 2004; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004).
In detail the changes are as follows.
• The establishment of a centralised appellate court for
patents, the so-called ‘Patent Court’, in 1992. This
court represents the change towards a pro-patent era
after a long period of weak patents. Data on patent liti-
gations show that the Patent Court has moved towards
strengthening patent holders’ rights (Gallini, 2002; Jaffe
and Lerner, 2004).
• The Bayh-Dole Act approved in the United States in
1980 to facilitate the commercialisation of inventions
developed in the public sector, allowing universities and
other publicly funded institutions to grant patents and
exclusively license the results of research contracts
funded by federal agencies. Through the Bayh-Dole
Act, publicly funded R&D has also become privately
exploitable. Several other OECD countries have imi-
tated the Bayh-Dole Act and introduced similar legisla-
tion (for an assessment, see Mowery and Sampat, 2004).
• The possibility to acquire the protection of patents has
been broadened to activities that were not previously
eligible. Often patents have been granted to inventions
that do not seem to be particularly useful, such as
devices for ‘measuring breasts with a tape to determine
bra size’, or ‘executing a tennis stroke while wearing a
knee pad’ (Gleick, 2003, p. 3). But the scope of patent
protection has also been extended to key sectors such as
software, business methods, statistical methods, genes,
plant genetics, micro-organisms and so on. This is
implementing what the US Supreme Court already
advocated in 1980: ‘anything under the sun that is
made by men’ should be worthy of patent protection
(Jaffe and Lerner, 2004, p. 115). Further, patents are
now granted also for discoveries that are very close to
‘life’: about 40,000 DNA-related patents have been
granted (Heller, 2008, p. 50).
Is the western IP system broken? Although they have not
been replicated to the same extent in Europe and Japan,
the stronger regime of IPRs that emerged in the USA has
become a model for other continents. But this model is far
from satisfactory. Three main kinds of criticisms have been
made.
What has the economics of innovation to say about knowledge and intellectual prop-
erty rights?
Lesson 1: To consider knowledge as information, as is often done in the debate on IPRs, leads to wrong analyses and policies. The acqui-
sition of knowledge requires that both the teacher and the learner are willing to devote time, resources and efforts to acquire it. This makes
the mechanisms of knowledge transmission more complex than those related to information.
Lesson 2: Any innovative process is based also on creative imitation and copying. There is no country that has managed to catch up with-
out relying on the knowledge base of other and more developed countries. A conceptual separation between ‘innovators’ and ‘imitators’ is
therefore wrong since good innovators build up the state of the art and good imitators need to improve to imitate and adopt others’ inno-
vations.
Lesson 3: To take advantage of foreign technologies, developing countries should put in place explicit policies to create adequate absorptive
capacity in terms of endogenous competences, skills, infrastructures and institutions.
Lesson 4: IPRs are just one of the channels used by companies to appropriate the returns from their innovations. There are cross-industry
differences in the effectiveness of IPRs and while pharmaceuticals are heavily dependent on patents and children’s films are heavily depen-
dent on copyrights, in the majority of industries IPRs are of moderate importance. Moreover, IPRs are much more effective if combined
with wider companies’ strategies, which include continuous learning and innovation.
Global Policy (2010) 1:2  2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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• Growing attention has been paid to the so-called ‘trag-
edy of the anti-commons’. Long ago, it was argued that
a lack of property rights might destroy private incen-
tives to maintain and upgrade public goods (Hardin,
1968). However, too much ownership may have the
opposite effect and in the realm of knowledge may
impede both the circulation of information and innova-
tion (Hardin, 1968; Heller, 2008; Heller and Eisenberg,
1998). This is particularly manifest in those industries
in which innovation relies on systemic technology and
integrated knowledge (i.e. biotechnology, computers
and telecommunications). IPRs are increasingly moving
deeper to cover data and facts that represent the basic
ingredients of scientific practice and research (Boyle,
2003; David, 2000). The proprietary structure of this
kind of knowledge could seriously hamper scientific
advancement.
• Because of the new legislation, firms have developed a
propensity to patent more in order to take hostage as
many technologies as they can to hamper other firms’
technological advancement and to avoid being blocked
themselves (Hall and Ziedonis, 2001; Ziedonis, 2004).
Rather than promoting innovation, they are restricting
innovative capacity to a few incumbent firms.
• Eventually, the current rules fail to provide predictable
property and produce costly disputes and excessive
litigation that outweigh positive incentives and profits
stemming from innovative activities (Bessen and
Meurer, 2008; Jaffe and Lerner, 2004). As John Barton
argued, ‘the number of intellectual property lawyers in
the US is growing faster than the amount of researchers’
(Barton, 2000, p. 1933). Instead of promoting innova-
tion, IPRs are diverting resources from innovation.
Is TRIPS the imposition of a rotten IP regime on to the deve-
loping world? TRIPS has become one of the most contro-
versial issues not only in academe, but also in the political
arena. Civil activists, NGOs and public opinion in general
have fiercely denounced TRIPS as a colonialist act impos-
ing the western standard of the IPRs system on the rest of
the world (Shiva, 2001). In fact, TRIPS is the key instru-
ment for the enlargement of the ‘silent revolution’ in IPRs
beyond the west.
The TRIPS Agreement strengthened previous standards
by mandating enforcement in all member countries and by
reforming the Dispute Settlement procedures within the
WTO. Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement applies a cor-
nerstone of the global trade policy, the so-called Most
Favoured Nation clause, to the IPRs (World Trade Orga-
nisation, 2009).5 Article 10 allows the copyright protection
of software and data sets, and fixes the term of protection
at no less than 50 years. Article 33 establishes that the pro-
tection of patents shall not end before 20 years. Article 35
requires member countries to protect the layout designs of
integrated circuits in accordance with the provisions of the
Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Cir-
cuits, negotiated under the auspices of the World Interna-
tional Property Organisation (WIPO) in 1989. Part 3 of the
TRIPS Agreement is dedicated to the enforcements of IPRs,
and Article 61 requires that members should provide civil as
well as criminal remedies for the infringement of IPRs. This
implies that all WTO members should develop or modernise
their judicial systems and enforcement procedures to comply
with TRIPS (World Trade Organisation, 2009).
Through TRIPS, the IP systems of the most advanced
countries are therefore exported from developed to develop-
ing countries, from countries that invest massively in R&D
and innovation to countries with limited resources and
infrastructures, from net high-tech exporters to net import-
ers. Before the TRIPS Agreement most developing coun-
tries did not extend protection to emerging technologies
such as software, integrated circuits and electronic databas-
es, or allow IP to plant varieties. One of the most contro-
versial issues has been the possibility of patenting in
pharmaceuticals, an industry to which TRIPS dedicates
special attention (Lanoszka, 2003). India, Brazil, Argen-
tina, Mexico and several other countries had weak IP pro-
tection on drugs which allowed the development of a
generic drug national industry that is now incompatible
with TRIPS.
Regarding the enforcement and dispute settlement provi-
sions, TRIPS introduces a fundamental novelty with
respect to the previous international setting. Neither the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
nor the Berne Convention for the Protection of Artistic
and Literary Property provided effective procedures for set-
tling IPRs disputes. TRIPS has dramatically changed this
state of affairs by linking IPRs to international trade,
allowing advanced countries to increase further their bar-
gaining power in the WTO. This ensures more effective
enforcement and the possibility of using trade provisions,
such as tariffs and quotas, to punish rule-breaking
countries. Table 1 shows the disputes within the WTO
concerning TRIPS. This ‘who is suing whom’ table shows
that the US have the lion’s share of disputes.
The harmonisation of IPRs introduced by the TRIPS
Agreement has led to a race to the top which is certainly
not advantageous to countries wishing to catch up by
acquiring the expertise, knowledge and innovations of the
leaders (Chang, 2003). Moreover, for most WTO mem-
bers, TRIPS is an exogenous introduction of rules and
standards. It is somehow surprising that this expansion of
western standards occurred at a time when the usefulness
of IPRs as a method to foster innovation and knowledge
development is seriously challenged also in the west. Why
has this happened? In the next section we will show how a
few corporations succeeded in persuading more than 100
countries, most of them net importers of technology, to
‘approve’ the most important revolution in global IPRs.
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Second thesis: TRIPS is the outcome of a nondemo-
cratic process driven by a club of US corporations
A club of US multinational corporations played a major
role in getting the TRIPS Agreement, providing one of
the most important lessons on how business power shapes
international politics (Ryan, 1998; Sell, 2003). However,
this should not necessarily be seen as a sign of the strength
of the American economy, but rather as the consequence of
the progressive erosion of US technological hegemony.
Already at the beginning of the 1980s US supremacy in
high-tech trade resulted in a showdown because of the
impressive growth of Japan and, to a lesser extent, of Eur-
ope (Nelson and Wright, 1992; Pianta, 1988; Rosenberg
and Steinmueller, 1988).
US trade policy undertook by the mid-1980s a major
shift in response to threats to its technological world hege-
mony. Beginning in the early 1980s, its annual trade deficit
reached unprecedented levels. The US trade deficit topped
$100 billion in 1984 and peaked at a record $153 billion in
1987 (US Department of Commerce, 2009). Linking the
loss of market shares to IP infringement by other countries
could provide an explanation for the former and a policy
action for the latter. US corporations hoped to find a
remedy to their lack of competitiveness by making IPRs
stronger in their markets abroad. By the mid-1980s the US
administration also began to encompass international affairs
in its pro-IPRs silent revolution. This was justified by the
feeling that free trade was no longer fair trade, since a sub-
stantial part of R&D and innovative investments financed
by American corporations were appropriated without pay-
ment by competing firms in other countries. As the former
assistant general counsel of the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR) said, ‘Our companies find that they must
compete with the unauthorized copies not only in the
source country but in third countries as well’ (cited in Sell,
2003, p. 81).
In a more integrated global trade regime, in which high-
tech industries were becoming the crucial factor of compet-
itiveness, the fact that other countries had a more permis-
sive regime of IP was perceived as one of the causes of the
US trade deficit. As the assistant secretary of commerce
argued, ‘there is a widespread bipartisan agreement that the
protection of intellectual property worldwide is a critically
important factor in expanding trade in high technology
products’ (cited in Sell, 2003, p. 83). The link between
trade and IPRs was formally established in 1984 in the
Trade and Tariff Act in which, under section 301, IP pro-
tection became a motive for assessing other countries’ eligi-
bility for nonreciprocal trade concessions.6
From 1984 until the signing of the TRIPS Agreement
of 1994 the USTR played a major role in bringing the
interests of the US corporations into the global arena. Dur-
ing the Uruguay Round the USTR was closely connected
with the major corporations through the International
Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) and the Intellectual
Property Committee (IPC). The IIPA was created to pro-
mote the copyright industry interest, while the IPC con-
sisted of 12 chief executive officers representing IPRs-
intensive industries. These influential business associations
(Ryan, 1998) provided the USTR with several reports in
which they pointed out the damages caused to US business
by IP piracy country by country. The IPC’s major achieve-
ment was involving European and Japanese industry in
their policy so that the US, Europe and Japan were united
about the inclusion of an IP code in the General Agree-
ment on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). When eventually the
WTO replaced GATT in 1994, it included the TRIPS
Agreement as one of its core pillars. As Susan Sell explic-
itly claims, ‘twelve corporations made public law for the
world’ (Sell, 2003, p. 96). In return, developing countries
obtained the liberalisation of international trade in textiles
and apparel through the Multifibre Agreement (see also
Maskus, 2000).
Third thesis: TRIPS may serve the interests of western
corporations but not necessarily those of western
economies
The fact that TRIPS has been a western imposition does
not necessarily imply that it will manage to serve western
interests. Since the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement
Table 1. Who is suing whom? Disputes cases related to TRIPS and TRIPS enforcement
Sued country
USA EC Argentina Brazil Canada Denmark Greece India Ireland Pakistan Portugal Sweden Japan Total
Complainant USA n.a. 5 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 20
EC 3 n.a. 1 1 1 6
Australia 1 1
Brazil 1 n.a. 1
Canada 1 n.a. 1
Total 4 7 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 29
Source: Authors’ elaboration on WTO data (World Trade Organisation, 2009).
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the trend of trade performance of the USA and other
advanced countries has not changed remarkably. Emerging
countries, those which TRIPS aimed to discipline for
their alleged unfair IP infringement, have continued to
erode the trade balance of the US, Europe and Japan.
TRIPS has so far certainly served the interests of some
specific corporations, but it does not alone seem to be
able to solve the problems for which it has been imposed,
namely the challenge to western primacy in knowledge-
intensive industries.
In Figure 1 we report the average annual growth of
exports relative to high-tech products for some selected
countries, over the period 1999–2005. The two emerging
giants, China and India, continue to improve their perfor-
mance in the international trade of high-tech industries
against the triad, that is, the US, Europe and Japan. This
trend is confirmed also in terms of the world share of
high-tech exports reported in Table 2. In 2005 China
became the largest exporter of computers and office
machinery, reaching a world share equal to 28.3 per cent,
followed by the US (14.6 per cent) and the EU-25 (8.3 per
cent), and the second largest world exporter in electronics
and telecoms. The supremacy of the triad is still evident in
an IPR-sensitive industry such as pharmaceuticals, where
western countries still account for over 70 per cent of world
exports.
Not surprisingly, political concern about declining US
competitiveness has shifted from infringement of IPRs
towards offshore outsourcing and offshoring.7 The White
Paper ‘Offshore Outsourcing and America’s Competitive
Edge: Losing Out in the High Technology R&D and Ser-
vices Sectors’ released by Senator Joe Lieberman in May
2004 illustrates a rather different concern. The White
Paper focuses on the ‘challenge, which potentially could
affect high and R&D research jobs, not just manufacturing
and call center jobs’ (Lieberman, 2004, p. 2, emphasis
added). The main point raised is that US corporations are
moving key components of their innovative activities
abroad, such as engineering, design, R&D and high-tech
services. According to a survey carried out by UNCTAD
(2005), transnational corporations (TNCs) perceive China
and India as the first and third most attractive locations,
respectively, to invest in R&D activities. The Toyota Tech-
nical Centre in Thailand, Motorola’s R&D centres in
China and Microsoft’s sixth global research centre in Ban-
galore are just a few examples witnessing the fact that
TNCs are investing at the cutting edge of technology in
emerging countries (UNCTAD, 2005) (on the globalisa-
tion of technology see also Archibugi and Iammarino,
2002; Archibugi and Pietrobelli, 2003).
The TRIPS Agreement has therefore not reversed coun-
tries’ relative performance since 1994. The real winners
from TRIPS are not advanced countries, but rather the
large corporations that pressed for its adoption. Empirical
research has shown that multinational corporations are
more likely to establish advanced and knowledge-based
activities abroad if there is a strong and effective IPRs
regime.8 Multinational corporations willing to expand their
scope geographically therefore need stronger IPRs regimes
in the host countries (UNCTAD, 2005, p. 29).
The TRIPS Agreement, by strengthening the IP regime
all over the world, has basically contributed to enlarging
the playing field for large corporations. The latter have
seen the opportunity to move their knowledge-based activi-
ties abroad by exploiting human resources, technological
capabilities and a more reliable IPRs system. In the words
of Senator Lieberman, ‘while the American companies may
be improving their individual competitiveness in the short
term, they may be collectively undermining America’s and
their own competitiveness for the long haul’ (Lieberman,
2004, p. 3). It is somehow surprising and worth reflecting
upon the fact that western governments, first and foremost
that of the US, have insisted so strongly on introducing a
new global regime of IPRs that might jeopardise the inter-
ests of their own citizens.
Fourth thesis: TRIPS alone will not lead to an increase
in the technology gap between western countries and
emerging countries
While many commentators argue that TRIPS alone may
lead to an increase in the gap between the most techno-
logically advanced and the least technologically advanced
nations (see, for example, Chang, 2003; May, 2002a), we
believe that the importance of IPRs should not be over-
estimated. IPRs clearly favour the generators of innova-
tions and deter the imitators. But the lack of a clear-cut
division between innovators and imitators, which stems
from the complexity of the mechanisms of generation and
diffusion of knowledge and innovation, will not allow
IPRs and arrangements such as TRIPS to play a decisive
role.
National IP systems are often the consequence of pro-
duction needs (Moser, 2005). Developed countries have
exempted particular industries from IP protection in accor-
dance with their needs at a particular time. Since the 18th
century, IP policy has been conducted as an important part
of trade and industrial policy (Khan, 2002). For example,
Germany did not provide patent protection to food prod-
ucts, pharmaceutical or chemical products, but only to their
production processes. American law at the beginning pro-
vided strong protection for US citizens but weak protection
for foreign inventors. The Japanese system was deliberately
designed to favour adoption and diffusion of technology
(Ordover, 1991). In a similar vein, India did not allow pat-
ent protection for drugs, chemicals, optical glass or semi-
conductors, Thailand excluded chemicals, drugs, food and
agricultural machinery and Brazil did not offer protection
for foodstuffs, chemicals and drugs (Chang, 2003; Khan,
2002).
 2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2010) 1:2
Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti
144
If we look at how the IPRs systems have evolved within
nations, there is a well-founded suspicion that strong IPRs
seem to be the consequence rather than the cause of development
(Maskus, 2000; Mokyr, 2002). As countries climb the
development ladder and they become producers of innova-
tions and technologies, the strengthening of IPRs is likely
to occur as a result both of industrial policy and pressure
from business. However, we contend that, while recognis-
ing that IP has played an important role in sustaining
industrial policies and development, today there are several
factors at work that can impede TRIPS with the result of
widening the technological gap between western and
emerging economies.
A great deal of empirical work has been carried out to
address a simple question: do stronger IPRs encourage
transfer of technology?9 The main findings of this body
of literature can be synthesised as follows: IPRs can be
advantageous for countries with a certain degree of
absorptive capacity and strong technological infrastruc-
tures, while they tend to increase costs and reduce tech-
nology transfer for poorer countries. This evidence
reinforces our assumption that the impact of IPRs on
technology transfer has been overestimated since the mag-
nitude of technology flows is affected by a variety of other
factors, including: size of the market, development of
appropriate capabilities, endowment of cheap and ⁄ or
skilled human resources and the presence of a reliable
institutional environment. In a nutshell, a strong IPR
regime is not in itself a sufficient condition for the transfer of
technology to occur.
IPRs do not have a direct role in explaining different
rates of growth across countries (Park and Ginarte, 1997),
and as the World Bank recognises, ‘at different times and
in different regions of the world, countries have realised
high rates of growth under varying degrees of IPR
protection’ (World Bank, 2001, p. 142). Within the
manufacturing sector, the only industry in which IPRs
seem to have good efficacy in avoiding copying is pharma-
ceuticals. In most manufacturing industries, thus, the
processes at the base of the adoption, adaptation and
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Figure 1. Average annual growth of exports relative to the hi-tech products for selected countries, 1999–2005.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from the European Commission report ‘Europe in the Global Research Landscape’ (European Commission,
2007).
Table 2. High-tech exports: world market shares 1999–2005 (%)
Total hi-tech
products
Computer and
Machinery
Office Electronics
and Telecoms Pharmaceutical
1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005 1999 2005
United States 26.4 19.3 18.9 14.6 23.4 14.7 20.2 22.8
EU-25 17.1 17.2 8.2 8.3 11.5 12.1 38.6 45.6
China 3.4 15.0 4.9 28.3 2.9 12.9 3.1 3.6
Japan 12 8.7 11.9 6.0 13.3 9.6 4.0 2.3
South Korea 4.7 5.8 4.3 4.7 7.0 7.7 0.8 0.5
Brazil 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.2
India 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.5 l.9
Russian Federation 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data from the European Commission report ‘Europe in the Global Research Landscape’ (European Commission,
2007).
Global Policy (2010) 1:2  2010 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
The Globalisation of IPRs
145
creative imitation of foreign technologies have substantial
scope for inventing, avoiding IP infringements even in a
stronger IPRs regime.
On several occasions IPRs have also made it easier to
invent around protected technologies inasmuch as patents
and copyright force inventors to articulate and provide dis-
closure of information.10 The institution of IPRs provides
a legal framework for contractual agreements concerning
technologies, which encourage the institution of ‘markets
for technology’, making easier the international transfer of
technology and its diffusion at the local level (Arora et al.,
2001; Lall, 2003). New emerging phenomena, such as open
source software, which offer innovative applications on a
nonproprietary IPRs basis and which cannot be made leg-
ally excludable, offer considerable opportunities for emerg-
ing and developing countries to access crucial know-how at
very low costs while avoiding IP infringements. Thus, it is
the nature of knowledge generation and diffusion mecha-
nisms themselves that make the real world very different
from a hypothetical one in which IPRs are able to block
the use of specific know-how. To conclude, we challenge
the idea that TRIPS can be held responsible for the inabil-
ity of developing countries to catch up since technology
flows across countries are not driven by IPRs regimes
alone.
4. Policy implications: much ado about
nothing?
Over the last 30 years, the United States has begun a race
to increase the proprietary nature of knowledge, and it has
managed to obtain at various stages the support of other
western countries. This privatisation of knowledge has also
acquired an international dimension through TRIPS, an
agreement pushed by a small number of western multina-
tional corporations which has aimed to impose on the
entire world a regime of IPRs dominant in the west and
showing evident signs of crisis. The strengthening of IPRs
and TRIPS, however, has not and could not change the
nature of knowledge and the ways in which this can be
transferred among economic agents. As we have reiterated
in this article, to achieve the successful transfer of know-
how between economic agents, both of them should be
willing to devote time, resources and efforts to teach and
to learn. For these reasons, we have argued that the impor-
tance of IPRs has been grossly overestimated: they can nei-
ther allow knowledge transfer nor obstruct it per se. On
the one hand, IPRs cannot impede prospective imitators
from acquiring knowledge but just make the process a little
lengthier and a little more costly. Firms, in fact, profit
much more from their economic monopoly position built
around their innovation than from the legal monopoly asso-
ciated with their IPRs. On the other hand, even in the
absence of IPRs, potential imitators will not be able to
master knowledge unless they invest their time and
resources. In spite of the often heated tone of the debate,
the IPRs controversy seems to be one that is ‘much ado
about nothing’.
It is true that some key industries rely strongly on IPRs
both at home and internationally. It is well known that
pharmaceutical products are effectively protected by
patents. Developing countries that cannot pay the full price
for these drugs will not find themselves in a position to
offer their citizens the medications they deserve. The judi-
cial case of a few US pharmaceutical companies (the so-
called Big Pharma) against the South African government
for the use of drugs to combat HIV infection has been
most spectacular precisely because at stake were concen-
trated economic interests on the one hand and a lifesaving
drug on the other. But can we generalise from this case?
Four theses to assess TRIPS
First Thesis: TRIPS aims to impose the western and broken IP regime on the rest of the world.
The IPRs regime has become stronger in the western world. This trend began in the United States, where the scope of IPRs has been
extended to additional areas (e.g. software) and to additional subjects (e.g. public research centres and universities). But other western coun-
tries have imitated the same trend. Through TRIPS, the US and other western governments are trying to expand western logic to all coun-
tries. This has happened at a time when the ability of IPRs to provide incentives to innovators and to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge
has been increasingly questioned in the west itself.
Second Thesis: TRIPS is the outcome of a nondemocratic process driven by a club of US corporations. TRIPS has not been debated and
negotiated as a global public good. On the contrary, it has been strongly pushed by the United States. In particular, it is the outcome of
the pressures made by a handful of US corporations which have successfully asked their government to act on their behalf.
Third Thesis: TRIPS may serve the interests of western corporations but not necessarily of western economies. There is no evidence that
TRIPS has been advantageous for American citizens at large. On the contrary, it seems that TRIPS has been important to allow TNCs to
expand their innovative activities globally, relying on stronger IP regimes abroad.
Fourth Thesis: TRIPS alone will not lead to an increase in the technology gap between western countries and emerging countries. Both
supporters and detractors of TRIPS have put too much emphasis on the economic significance of legal devices regulating intellectual prop-
erty. By themselves, legal devices can neither impede developing countries from catching up nor allow developed countries to preserve their
dominion in technological innovation. It is much more important to concentrate on the economic rather than the legal conditions that
allow or impede countries from maintaining or acquiring their knowledge base.
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There are not many lifesaving drugs around (unfortu-
nately!) and several of them are no longer protected by
IPRs. And we should not forget that the pharmaceuticals
industry is just one of many in the economy.
It is also true that other key sectors of the information
society are strongly dependent on other IPRs (Guy, 2007).
In spite of the massive investment by companies in the
industry to make it difficult to copy software, software rev-
enues benefit strongly from the legal protection guaranteed
by copyright. It is also true that audiovisual products rely
strongly on IPRs. These are the typical products that are
costly to produce but that can be copied at virtually zero
cost. Software and audiovisual entertainments are increas-
ingly important industries but, again, they do not represent
the total economy. It is difficult to justify that the eco-
nomic development of emerging countries is hampered by
the copyright on CDs and DVDs. And it is even more dif-
ficult to argue that pop singers, film stars and software
companies are ruined by IP infringements. Moreover,
stronger protection of IPRs may generate unexpected new
entrants, as happened with Linux in the case of software
and Bollywood in the case of audiovisuals. There is a ten-
dency to attribute to IPRs the creation of barriers to entry,
and this is in principle true since IPRs generate a legal
monopoly. But economic reality shows that barriers to
entry are more often associated with anticompetition prac-
tices than with IPRs alone. Weakening IPRs may help to
generate a more competitive market, but this should also
be combined with more active antitrust policies.
Those western-based corporations that have pressed so
hard for stronger IPRs have not realised that IPRs codify
the positions of the past, not those of the future. To stick to
the defence of IPRs is the typical position of losers, that is,
those that could maintain their market share only by relying
on monopoly positions achieved through the innovations of
the past. Winners, on the contrary, would be far less worried
about defending the innovations of the past through IPRs
since they are confident that they can maintain and enlarge
their market positions through continuous innovation. The
literature on appropriability has clearly shown that IPRs
are just one, and not even the most effective, method to
secure returns from companies’ innovations.
But our analysis also has some important implications for
public policies. We have argued that governments that have
made IPRs stronger at home and in the world have not
provided a good service to their citizens. In fact, they have
somehow diverted attention from the problem of offshoring
of knowledge-intensive jobs providing an advantage to their
major corporations without realising that their workers may
also pay a price for it. A better service to citizens would
have been provided by greater international cooperation in
science and technology, involving both public and business
players in large-scale research projects. These projects could
provide new technological opportunities that companies
would then be able to exploit competitively.
We have already made it clear that developing countries
should not have accepted TRIPS. Somehow these coun-
tries were confident that it would have been too difficult
to enforce TRIPS and that, after all, the WTO devices
were too slow and too complex to lead to sanctions of last
resort. This is in some way what has happened: the num-
ber of controversies continues to be rather small. But
opposing TRIPS will certainly not by itself allow develop-
ing countries to fill their technology gap. Developing
countries need much more demanding active policies to
acquire knowledge. Some of them have managed to move
from ‘developing’ to ‘emerging’ and even ‘developed’ coun-
tries. The active learning policies of these countries, such
as the East Asian tigers, created a realisation that there
are strong complementarities between domestic education,
acquisition of knowledge from abroad, hosting foreign
investment and endogenous innovation. The policies of
these countries should be a source of inspiration for those
countries that are still lagging behind.
Notes
We wish to thank Frederick Guy, Eva-Maria Nag and two referees
for comments on previous versions of this article.
1. According to the legend, Doctor Faustus, an earnest alchemist,
trades his soul to Mephistopheles to obtain 24 years of unre-
strained creativity.
2. For a review, see Maskus and Reichman, 2005; Mowery and
Oxley, 1997; UNCTAD, 2005.
3. Developmental state is a term used by international political econ-
omy scholars to refer to the phenomenon of state-led macroeco-
nomic planning in East Asia in the late 20th century. A
development state is characterised by having strong state interven-
tion, as well as extensive regulation and planning.
4. Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987; Mansfield, 1986; Merges
and Nelson, 1990; Von Hippel, 1998; Winter, 1987.
5. The Most Favoured Nation clause establishes that whatever more
favourable treatment is agreed for two or more countries is auto-
matically extended to all the other nations: in this case to all the
TRIPS signatories. Article 4 states: ‘With regards to the protec-
tion of intellectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by a Member to the nationals of any other
country, shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the
nationals of all other Members’.
6. For a more comprehensive explanation of the role of section
301 and bilateral policies see Drahos, 1995; Ryan, 1998; Sell,
2003.
7. Offshore outsourcing is the contracting of some business functions
to companies usually in lower-cost countries. Offshoring is used
instead to describe multinational corporations relocating work
from their domestic sites to foreign locations.
8. Mansfield, 1994, 1995; Maskus, 2000; Maskus and Reichman,
2005; UNCTAD, 2005.
9. Branstetter et al., 2004; Chen and Puttitanum, 2005; Lall, 2003;
Mansfield, 1994, 1995; Maskus, 2000.
10. Despite the legal requirement of disclosure, business patent law-
yers try to avoid the disclosure of strategic information at the base
of the functioning of a technology (Bessen and Meurer, 2008).
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